by Mayibuye Magwaza

So, the new Madagascan president has gone to the EU, asking them to keep the aid money flowing. South Africa (and the African Union in general) is backing the current talks, after Zuma rejected any notion of using force. Meanwhile, the Mail and Guardian reports that Ravalomanana has been talking to strange chaps of the mercenary persuasion, with a view to getting back on the island.

Firstly, I don’t think that the mercenary angle is going to work. The simple fact that we’re hearing about it means that the mission has been blown. The Equatorial Guinea coup got nipped in the bud long before it started, and a large part of the reason for this was the mercenary’s failure to maintain operational security. Pulling off a counter-coup would require secrecy and surprise. If the newspapers are reporting that you’re talking to mercenaries, it’s over before you’ve even begun.

Secondly, I’m a bit troubled by the way in which the AU has handled this matter. I don’t think that some kind of military invasion of Madagascar was ever really on the cards, but I’m a bit dismayed by the fact that the AU hasn’t even attempted to wave a significant stick.

The immediate problem with this is that the AU negotiators come to the table with a vastly weakened position. Even if the AU has no intention of executing any kind of military intervention, there’s no need for Zuma to actually admit this before negotiations begin. Calling on both sides to ‘avoid violence’ tells the Madagascan military very directly that they have nothing to fear. If the AU looks weak, the new regime will quite directly conclude that they don’t need to make concessions, and negotiations aren’t likely to accomplish much. As things stand, the Madagascan military regime has made noises that suggest it isn’t terribly eager to continue talks.

Lifting sanctions without getting clear concessions was probably another bad move. Giving the new regime concessions without clear results isn’t going to work, and we can see this by the fact that progress at the negotiating table has been non-existent.

Ultimately, if the AU is serious about stopping coups, they need to take a far more robust and aggressive approach. When an unconstitutional change of government takes place, the first moves should be to isolate and squeeze the new regime. Carrying a small stick and a big carrot does African democracy no favours, and the AU needs to recognize this.

There are always good reasons not to be aggressive, and negotiation is almost always the easiest response. However, failing to make hard choices when it counts means that the AU will always be faced with situations like this.