Noah Millman has a very good post on the Iranian election and what it means for US foreign policy, which is well worth reading in its entirety. I was particularly intrigued by this observation:

What will happen next? I would assume that much depends, as it did in China in 1989, on what the military is willing to do. In the Chinese case, early on in the crackdown, there were reports of armed clashes between the 27th Army and other units of the PLA; it was not clear to outside observers that there was unity either in the Central Committee or the upper ranks of the PLA, and the possibility of civil war with different parts of the PLA fighting on each side seemed real, if still unlikely. In retrospect, there probably was a reasonably high degree of unity at the highest levels of the PLA, and the PLA used its role in putting down the protests to dramatically increase its power and influence within the Chinese state.

That’s one possible outcome in Iran: that the military sides with the regime and puts down the protests, and thereby strengthens its hand within the regime (as against the security services and other rivals). That’s a lousy outcome for the Iranian people, not necessarily the worst outcome by any means for American interests. (My emphasis - Laurence.)

Would America really benefit from greater involvement by the Iranian military in Iranian politics? That’s an unusual proposition, but it’s not self-evidently crazy. Military involvement in politics often has a moderating effect on foreign policy, since generals tend to be less flippant about the use of force than civilian politicians. Also, there are many countries in which the military acts as a political counter-weight against radical Islam, notably Turkey and Algeria. But is there any good reasons to think that this would be the case in Iran, which has already been constituted as an Islamic state for thirty years now?